Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse.
Introduction
Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. In solution concepts like the core and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set agents are not farsighted in the sense that individual and coalitional deviations cannot be countered by subsequent deviations. These concepts are based on the direct dominance relation and neglect the destabilizing e¤ect of indirect dominance relations introduced by Harsanyi (1974) and formalized by Chwe (1994) . Based on the concept of indirect dominance, several solution concepts assume farsighted behavior of the agents in abstract social environments, coalition formation, network formation or matching models.
1 These solution concepts include, among others, the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Chwe, 1994) , the farsighted core (Diamantoudi and Xue, 2003) , the farsightedly stable set (Herings et al., 2010 ) , the pairwise farsightedly stable set (Herings et al., 2009 ) and the path dominance core (Page and Wooders, 2009 ).
Direct dominance implies indirect dominance. However, indirect dominance does not imply direct dominance. For this reason, any solution concept may give di¤er-ent predictions when considering either myopic or farsighted agents. For instance, in coalition formation games with positive spillovers (e.g. cartel formation with
Cournot competition and economies with pure public goods) Herings et al. (2010) and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) showed that the grand coalition is a farsightedly stable set, a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set and it always belongs to the largest consistent set. However, myopic stability concepts like the -core, -core or von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, do not select the grand coalition as a stable outcome. Regarding the marriage problem, Ehlers (2007) characterized von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets using the direct dominance relation, if such sets exist. He showed that these can be larger than the core. Mauleon et al. (2011) , using Chwe's (1994) de…nition of indirect dominance, showed the existence of and completely characterized the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable 1 See for instance Greenberg (1990) , Chwe (1994) and Xue (1998) about abstract social environments; Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) , Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) , and Herings et al.
(2010) about coalition formation; Dutta et al. (2005) , Page et al. (2005) , Herings et al. (2009) , and Page and Wooders (2009) about network formation; and Mauleon et al. (2011) and Klaus et al. (2011) about matching models.
sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton and belongs to the core. They also showed that the farsighted core, de…ned as the set of matchings that are not indirectly dominated by other matchings, can be empty. 2 On the contrary, in the formation of free trade networks, the global free trade network is a pairwise (myopically) stable network and also a pairwise farsightedly set in the model of Goyal and Joshi (2006) (see, Zhang et al., 2011) .
Recently, some experimental evidence has been provided about the existence of both myopic and farsighted agents. 3 However, it is not obvious to know ex-ante the type of agents that one is facing. Then, an interesting question to investigate is whether there are situations in which one should not care about the kind of agents that are being considered or, in other words, if there are situations where the predicted outcomes do not depend on the kind of agents (myopic or farsighted) that are involved in the studied situation. In the present paper, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems, i.e., roommate problems for which indirect dominance implies direct dominance when agents have strict preferences. As a consequence, in this kind of roommate problems, any solution concept based on direct or indirect dominance will give the same predictions. Roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) represent situations in which a …nite set of agents has to be partitioned into pairs (roommates) and singletons. Roommate problems are a generalization of the well-known marriage problem and a particular model of hedonic coalition formation (in which coalitions are restricted to have at most two agents) and of network formation (in which each agent is restricted to have at most one link). 4 Hence, roommate problems are a particularly interesting class of matching markets that lie in the intersection of network and coalition formation models. For this reason, by characterizing dominance invariant roommate problems, we provide the basis that could be used for characterizing dominance invariant coalition formation problems and dominance invariant network formation problems. To the best of 2 The farsighted core only exists when the core contains a unique matching and no other matching indirectly dominates the matching in the core. 3 Mantovani et al. (2011) have tested whether subjects behave myopically or farsightedly when forming a network. They have shown that behaviors consistent with farsightedness account for 75 percent of the individual observations, while only 6 percent of the individual observations are consistent with myopic behavior. 4 See Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and Jackson and Watts (2002) .
our knowledge, no characterization of dominance invariance has been provided up to now.
Our main result (Proposition 2) is that a roommate problem is dominance invariant if and only if two conditions are satis…ed. When two agents prefer to be matched to one another than being on their own, we say that these two agents are mutually acceptable. The …rst condition then states that mutually acceptable agents must prefer each other to any other agent (we interpret this condition as 'reciprocity').
The second condition concerns the position of agents in each individual ranking of the set of mutually acceptable agents. Consider, for instance, agent i's ranking of her mutually acceptable agents. If agent k (in i's ranking but not in the last position) prefers another agent l more than i, then agent i places k and l in the last two positions of this rank, with k more preferred than l. Informally, agent i penalizes these two agents: she penalizes agent k for not thinking highly of her and penalizes agent l out of jealousy. (We interpret this condition as 'extreme jealousy'.) Notice that, with this characterization of dominance invariant roommate problems, we provide two easy to verify conditions that tell us when one should care or not about the kind of agents (myopic or farsighted) that are being investigated. Whenever one of the two conditions for a roommate problem is not satis…ed, it is important to understand whether the agents under consideration are myopic or farsighted in order to use the appropriate stability concept.
We subsequently give some properties of agents'preferences in a roommate problem which is dominance invariant (Proposition 3) and we show (Proposition 4) that a roommate problem with three agents who prefer being matched to being unmatched is always dominance invariant. Such a roommate problem may have an empty core from which we conclude that the notion of dominance invariant has little in common with well-known restrictions on preferences guaranteeing existence and/or uniqueness of the core in the roommate problem such as -reducibility (Alcalde, 1995) or more generally, the weak top coalition property (Banerjee et al. 2001 
Roommate problems
A roommate problem, is a pair (N; P ) where N is a …nite set of agents and P is a preference pro…le specifying for each agent i 2 N a strict preference ordering over N . That is, P = fP (1); :::; P (i); :::; P (n)g, where P (i) is agent i's strict preference ordering over the agents in N including herself, which can be interpreted as the prospect of being alone. For instance, P (i) = 1; 3; i; 2; ::: indicates that agent i prefers agent 1 to agent 3 and she prefers to remain alone rather than get matched to anyone else. We denote by R the weak orders associated with P . We write j i k if agent i strictly prefers j to k, j i k if i is indi¤erent between j and k, and j % i k
A matching is a function : N ! N such that for all i 2 N , if (i) = j, then (j) = i. Agent (i) is agent i's mate at ; i.e., the agent with whom she is matched to share a room (possibly herself). We denote by M the set of all matchings. A matching is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to his or her partner, i.e. (i) % i i for all i 2 N . We denote the set of individually rational matchings for a roommate problem (N; P ) by I(N; P ). For a given matching , a pair fi; jg (possibly i = j) is said to form a blocking pair if they are not matched to one another but prefer one another to their partner at , i.e. j i (i) and i j (j).
A matching is stable if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair of agents.
A roommate problem (N; P ) is solvable if it has a stable matching. Otherwise, it is called unsolvable.
We extend each agent's preference over her potential partners to the set of matchings in the following way. We say that agent i prefers 0 to , if and only if agent i prefers her partner at 0 to her partner at , 0 (i) i (i). Abusing notation, we write this as
Throughout the paper we use the notation for weak inclusion and for strict inclusion. De…nition 1. Given a matching , a coalition S N is said to be able to enforce a matching 0 over if the following conditions hold for any agent i 2 N : (i)
In other words, this enforceability condition 6 implies both that any new pair in 0 that does not exist in must be formed by agents in S, and that in order to break an existing pair in , one of the two agents involved in that pair must belong to coalition S. Notice that the concept of enforceability is independent of preferences. Furthermore, the fact that coalition S N can enforce a matching 0 over implies that there exists a sequence of matchings 0 ; 1 ; :::; K (where 0 = and K = 0 ) and a sequence of disjoint pairs fi 0 ; j 0 g; :::; fi K 1 ; j K 1 g (possibly for some k 2 f0; 1; :::; K 1g, i k = j k ) such that for any k 2 f1; :::; Kg, the pair fi k 1 ; j k 1 g 2 S can enforce the matching k over k 1 . over .
De…nition 2. A matching is directly dominated by
An alternative way of de…ning the core of a roommate problem is by means of the domination relation. A matching is in the core if there is no subset of agents who, by rearranging their partnerships only among themselves, possibly dissolving some partnerships of , can all obtain a strictly preferred set of partners. Formally, a matching is in the core if is not directly dominated by any other matching 0 2 M. Given a pro…le P , we denote the set of matchings in the core by C(N; P ). Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that the core of a roommate problem may be empty.
This enforceability condition has also been used in Mauleon et al. (2011) and in Klaus et al. (2011). 7 Several papers are devoted to analyzing the core as solution for this matching problem. See for instance Tan (1991) , Chung (2000) , Diamantoudi et al. (2004) and Iñarra et al. (2010 
(ii) coalition S k 1 can enforce the matching k over k 1 .
Direct dominance can be obtained directly from De…nition 3 by setting K = 1. Proposition 1 (Klaus et al., 2011) . Let (N; P ) be a roommate problem and ; 0 2 I(N; P ). Then, 0 if and only if there does not exist a pair fi; 0 (i)g that blocks .
Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), showed that if a matching belongs to the core, then it indirectly dominates any other matching.
Lemma 1 (Diamantoudi and Xue, 2003) . If 2 C(N; P ), then 8 0 6 = , it holds that 0 .
Dominance Invariant Roommate Problems
We de…ne a roommate problem to be dominance invariant if and only if indirect dominance implies direct dominance.
De…nition 4. A roommate problem (N; P ) is dominance invariant if the following condition holds:
Let (N; P ) be a roommate problem. Let i 2 N . We denote by t(i) the most preferred partner for agent i. That is, t(i) % i j for any j 2 N . Let T denote the set of agents who are ranked …rst by her most preferred agent; i.e.,
Given the roommate problem (N; P ), the set A i denotes the set of agents acceptable for agent i, that is A i = fj 2 N : j i ig and the set M i denotes the set of mutually acceptable agents for i, that is
denote the least preferred partner for i in this set; i.e., 8k 2
denote the set of mutually acceptable agents of i who are less preferred than k, that
If agent i strictly prefers every agent in R to any agent in Z, then agent i strictly prefers the set R to the set Z. This is denoted by R i Z.
The notion of a ring is a key notion for the existence of stable matchings in roommate problems. A ring S = fs 1 ; :::; s k g N is an ordered set of agents such that k 3 and for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i s i (subscript modulo k).
The existence of odd rings in the preference pro…le is a necessary condition for the emptiness of the core in a roommate problem.
Lemma 2. Let (N; P ) be a roommate problem such that C(N; P ) = ?. Then, there exists a ring S = fs 1 ; : : : ; s k g, where k is odd.
This lemma is straightforward from the necessary and su¢ cient condition provided by Tan (1991) for the emptiness of the core in a roommate problem. We refer the reader to Appendix A for a compilation of de…nitions and results about the solvability of roommate problems.
Our main result characterizes the dominance invariant roommate problems.
Proposition 2. A roommate problem (N; P ) is dominance invariant if and only if the preference relation P satis…es the following two conditions:
The proof of this proposition, as well as all other proofs, may be found in Appendix B. The …rst condition can be seen as 'reciprocity', in the sense that agent i prefers the agents that are mutually acceptable for her to the agents that do not accept her although she accepts them. The second condition says that if two agents i; k are mutually acceptable, with k 6 = !(i), but k prefers another mutually acceptable agent l more than i, then, there cannot be any agent mutually acceptable for i less preferred than k, di¤erent from l. In other words, l is the least preferred potential partner for i among her mutually acceptable agents. Moreover, there are no agents in agent i's preferences less preferred than k but more preferred than l.
This condition may be interpreted as 'extreme jealousy'. If agent i likes agent k and vice versa, but agent k likes another mutually acceptable agent l better (than agent i), then either k is the worst mutually acceptable agent for i (agent i penalizes k for not considering her the best), or k and l are the worst ranked mutually acceptable agents for i, with l less preferred that k (agent i is jealous of k and l).
The next proposition describes some properties of agents'preferences in a roommate problem which is dominance invariant. They depend on the cardinality of the sets of mutually acceptable agents in the problem.
9
Proposition 3. Let (N; P ) be a dominance invariant roommate problem, P1. Let i be an agent such that jM i j > 2 and assume, without loss of generality, that M i = fj 1 ; : : : ; j k ; !(i)g such that j m i j m+1 , 8m 2 f1; : : : ; k 1g and
S is a ring in P such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
8 Notice that l equals !(i).
9 From now on, jM j denotes the cardinality of the set M .
P3
. For all i = 2 T , there is no agent j = 2 T such that i 2 M j , except from those belonging to a ring S in P such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Let us interpret all these properties. Consider any agent i with more than two mutually acceptable agents. Then, by P1.a, i 2 T . The least preferred agent for
2)) or ranks as top choice either i or t(i) (b.1). The remaining agents in M i rank i as their most preferred agent, except j k when t(!(i)) = j k . Consider now any agent i with at most two mutually acceptable agents. By P2 either i 2 T or her top ranked agent is j 2 T with t(j) 6 = i or it belongs to a ring formed by 3 agents such that each player in the ring considers acceptable only the other agents in the ring. Properties P1 and P2 allow us to determine which agents belong to set T . The remaining agents, those who do not belong to set T , by P3 cannot be mutually acceptable among them, except those belonging to a ring formed by 3 agents in which all agent in the ring prefer being matched among themselves to being matched with any other agent.
Example 1. The following example of a dominance invariant roommate problem may be useful for clarifying the previous results. Agents that do not appear in the other agent's preferences are unacceptable.
P (1) P (2) P (3) P (4) P (5) P (6) P (7) P (8) 1 In this problem, the set of mutually acceptable agents are M 1 = f2; 3; 4; 5g, M 2 = M 3 = f1g, M 4 = f5; 1g and M 5 = f4; 1g, M 6 = f7; 8g, M 7 = f6; 8g and M 8 = f6; 7g. Notice that the …rst condition in Proposition 2 is satis…ed since these agents are in the …rst rows of each agent's preferences. Consider for instance agent 1's preferences, P (1). Notice that agents 1 and 4 are mutually acceptable and 4 is not the worse agent in M 1 , however, 5 4 1. Then, by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, agent 5 must be the immediate less preferred agent than 4 for agent 1. Notice that {6,7,8} form an odd ring in the preferences.
In this example, the only agent satisfying jM i j 2 is agent 1 with M 1 = f2; 3; 4; 5g and 2 1 3 1 4 1 5. We can see that 8j 2 f2; 3g, t(j) = 1 (P1.a in Proposition 3). Moreover, it must happen that t(4) 2 f1; 5g (P1.b in Proposition 3). In this case, t(4) = 5 and therefore t(5) = 4 (P1.b.2 in Proposition 3).
On the other hand, all the other agents satisfy jM i j 2. For i 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g,
we can check that t(i) 2 T . Agents in the set f6; 7; 8g form a ring satisfying that 8s i 2 f6; 7; 8g, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i k for all k 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Notice also that for i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, there is no pair of agents who do not belong to T such that they are mutually acceptable. In our example, the only agent who is not in T is agent 3, and there is no agent j in P (3) (j = 2 T ) such that j 3 3 and
The following result shows that all roommate problems such that jN j = 3 in which all agents prefer to be matched to being unmatched are dominance invariant.
Proposition 4. Let (N; P ) be a roommate problem such that jN j = 3 and 8i 2 N :
Note that this class of roommate problems can have an empty core when the three agents form an odd ring in P . This then implies that the notion of dominance invariance has little in common with restrictions on preferences which guarantee the existence and/or uniqueness of stable matchings (e.g. -reducibility (Alcalde, 1995) or more generally, the weak top coalition property (Banerjee et al., 2001) ).
The following proposition characterizes the dominance invariant roommate problems with a non-empty core.
Proposition 5. Let (N; P ) be a dominance invariant roommate problem. C(N; P ) 6 = ? if and only if there is no ring S in P such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
The following result, derived from the previous one, states that if a roommate problem is dominance invariant and the core is non-empty, it has a unique stable matching. In this stable matching, all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
Proposition 6. Let (N; P ) be a solvable dominance invariant roommate problem.
Then, C(N; P ) = f C g, where C is such that C (i) = t(i) for all i 2 T , and
Example 1 (cont.) In this example, we have already seen that there is a ring S = f6; 7; 8g in P such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g. Therefore this roommate problem is unsolvable and there is no stable matching.
Consider the roommate problem derived from the previous one such that N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and P = fP (1); P (2); P (3); P (4); P (5)g. In this case, there is no ring in preferences satisfying the conditions above and therefore the problem is solvable.
The core, in this case, is formed by the matching C = ff1; 2g; f3g; f4; 5gg.
Finally notice that, when the dominance invariant roommate problem is solvable, the core and the farsighted core (as well as the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set) coincide.
Conclusion
We have characterized dominance invariant roommate problems when preferences are strict. Appendix A Tan (1991) establishes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the solvability of roommate problems with strict preferences in terms of stable partitions. This notion, which is crucial in the investigation of the core for these problems, can be formally de…ned as follows.
Let A = fa 1 ; :::; a k g N be an ordered set of agents. The set A is a ring if k 3 and for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, a i+1 a i a i 1 a i a i (subscript modulo k). The set
A is a pair of mutually acceptable agents if k = 2 and for all i 2 f1; 2g, a i 1 a i a i (subscript modulo 2). 10 The set A is a singleton if k = 1.
De…nition 5. A stable partition is a partition P of N such that:
(i) for all A 2 P , the set A is a ring, a mutually acceptable pair of agents or a singleton, and
(ii) for any sets A = fa 1 ; :::; a k g and B = fb 1 ; :::; b l g of P (possibly A = B), the following condition holds:
for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and j 2 f1; :::; lg such that b j 6 = a i+1 :
Condition (i) speci…es the sets contained in a stable partition, and condition (ii) contains the notion of stability to be applied between these sets (and also inside each set).
Note that a stable partition is a generalization of a stable matching. To see this,
consider a matching and a partition P formed by pairs of agents and/or singletons.
Let A = fa 1 ; a 2 = (a 1 )g and B = fb 1 ; b 2 = (b 1 )g be sets of P . If P is a stable partition then Condition (ii) implies that if b 1 a 2 a 1 then b 2 b 1 a 2 , which is the usual notion of stability. Hence is a stable matching.
10 Hereafter we omit subscript modulo k.
Remark 1 (Iñarra et al., 2010 Suppose that condition (i) is not satis…ed. Then there exists an agent i 2 N such that k i j for some k 2 A i n M i and some j 2 M i . Let 2 be a matching such that 2 (i) = k and 2 (s) = s for every s 6 = i; k, and let 1 be a matching such that 1 (i) = j and 1 (s) = s for every s 6 = i; j. Then 1 2 (since k k i, agent k enforces the matching in which every agent is alone, and this matching is blocked by fi; jg enforcing 1 ). However, 1 2 since 2 i 1 .
Suppose that condition (ii) is not satis…ed. Then there exists an agent k 2 M i n f!(i)g and an agent l 2 M k such that l k i and flg 6 = M k i . Then it must exist an agent j 6 = l such that j 2 M k i . Let 2 be a matching such that 2 (i) = k and 2 (s) = s for every s 6 = i; k, and let 1 be a matching such that 1 (k) = l, 1 (i) = j and where 1 (s) = s for every s 6 = i; k; l; j. Then 1 2 (since fk; lg block 2 enforcing a matching in which i and j are alone, and this matching is blocked by fi; jg enforcing 1 ). However, 1 2 since 2 i 1 .
(() Now we will prove that if 1 2 and conditions (i) and (ii) are satis…ed, then 1 > 2 .
Let D = fi 2 N : 1 i 2 g. First, we prove that for any agent i 2 N such that 1 (i) 6 = 2 (i) and 1 (i) 6 = i, we have that i 2 D . By contradiction, let 1 (i) = j and let 2 (i) = k and assume that k i j (which implies that k 6 = j). Notice that j 2 M i because otherwise fi; jg would never be formed contradicting 1 2 . Then, by condition (i), k 2 M i . Since 1 2 and i prefers 2 to 1 , k must prefer 1 to 2 because, otherwise, fi; kg would be a blocking pair of 1 contradicting that 1 2 11 A ring is odd (even) if its cardinality is odd (even).
[see Proposition 1].
12 Then, the partner of k at 1 , say for instance 1 (k) = l (with l 6 = k; j), by condition (i), also belongs to the set of mutually acceptable agents of agent k given that l k i, that is l 2 M k . But then, according to (ii), it must be that
But this is a contradiction, since j 2 M k i . Hence, agent i should prefer 1 (i) to 2 (i), and, by the same reasoning, 1 j 2 . Therefore fi; 1 (i)g D. Consider now any agent i 2 N such that 1 (i) = i 6 = 2 (i) = k. Since 1 2 , then either 1 (k) k i and k deviates leaving agent i unmatched (with 1 (k) also preferring 1 to 2 ) and then fk; 1 (k)g D, or i i k and agent i individually deviates and therefore i 2 D.
Then the coalition D deviates from 2 enforcing 1 and 1 > 2 as we wanted to prove.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3]
We will show the di¤erent parts of this proposition by contradiction.
P1. Assume that (a) is not satis…ed. That is, there exists an agent j 2 M i n fj k ; !(i)g such that t(j) 6 = i. This implies that 9k 2 N such that t(j) = k and . Now we will show that (b) must be satis…ed as well. The fact that t(j k ) 2 fi; !(i)g is straightforward from condition (ii) of Proposition 2.
In order to prove (b.1), let t(j k ) = i. First, we will show that if
, we have that l = i. Given that l 2 M k and l = i, it holds that k 2 M i . Let k 6 = t(i), otherwise we are done. Then since i 2 M k n f!(k)g and there exists
k . But this implies that k 0 = !(i) and this is a 12 Although Proposition 1 is stated requiring and 0 to be individually rational, the ")"-part of the proposition, which is the one used in this proof, holds for any two di¤erent matchings (individually rational or not). See proof in Klaus et al. (2011) (pp. 926-927). contradiction since !(i) i k. So we have proved that when
Now we will show that if t(!(i)) = 2 fi; t(i)g, then !(i) 2 T . Let t(!(i)) = k with k 6 = i; t(i). By condition (ii) of Proposition 2, either t(k) = !(i) and we are done, or there exists an agent l 2 M k such that l k !(i) and flg = M k !(i) , which implies that l = i. Following the previous reasoning, we achieve the same contradiction (!(i) i k) and this proves that !(i) 2 T as desired.
Next, we proceed to prove (b.2). Let t(j k ) = !(i). We will prove that in
By condition (ii) of Proposition 2, either t(!(i)) = j k and we are done, or
P2. Let i be an agent such that jM i j 2. We will prove that either t(i) 2 T or agent i belongs to a ring S such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i r for any r 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Consider …rst that M i = fjg. If t(j) = i we are done, so assume that t(j) = k with k 6 = i. By the reasoning in [P1.], if jM j j > 2, then t(k) = j and we are done. So let jM j j 2. Since k 2 M j nf!(j)g, by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, either t(k) = j or there exists an agent l 2 M k such that l k j and flg = M k j . However, this implies
Consider now the case that M i has two elements. Without loss of generality, let M i = fj; kg with j i k. Since j 2 M i n f!(i)g and by condition (ii)
of Proposition 2, we deduce (following the same reasoning as before) that t(j) 2 fi; kg. Let assume that t(j) = k, otherwise we are done. We will show that either t(k) = j or there exists a ring S = fi; j; kg such that 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i r for all r 2 fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Assume that there exists an agent s 2 M j n fi; kg such that s j i. Since j 2 M i n !(i), by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, fsg = M j i , which implies s = k. Therefore, there cannot be any agent di¤erent from k more preferred than i in agent j's preferences.
Consider now the case such that there exists an agent s 2 M j such that i j s.
Then jM j j > 2 and by the reasoning of [P1.], t(j) = k implies t(k) = j.
Let M j = fk; ig with k j i. Then, k 2 M j n !(j) and by condition (ii)
of Proposition 2, either t(k) = j and we are done or there exists an agent l 2 M k such that l k j and flg = M k j , which implies l = i. Given that there cannot be any agent between i and j in agent k's preferences, we have that S = fi; j; kg form a ring in P such that 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i r for any r 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g as we wanted to prove.
P3. Now, we will prove, by contradiction, that there is no pair of agents not belonging to T who are mutually acceptable among themselves, except from those belonging to an odd ring S such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i r for any r 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g. Assume that there are two agents i; j = 2 T such that i 2 M j and they do not belong to a ring with the features mentioned above. First, notice that jM i j 2, otherwise by [P1.], i 2 T and this is a contradiction. By [P2.] we know that if M i = fjg then j 2 T , contradicting the initial assumption. Then let M i = fj; kg. We know by [P2.] that if i is not in a ring t(i) 2 T , which implies that t(i) 6 = j, since j = 2 T . Let t(i) = k (with k 6 = j). Since k i j, by condition (i) of Proposition 2, we have that k 2 M i . Since i = 2 T , it follows that t(k) 6 = i, and then t(k) = l with l 6 = i.
, which implies l = j and therefore t(k) = j. Since j = 2 T , jM j j 2 and we know that M j = fi; kg. Since i j k (otherwise j 2 T , which is a contradiction) then it is to verify that agents i, j and k form a ring S such that 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i r for all r 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4]
Suppose that 8i 2 N , j i i for any j 6 = i but (N; P ) is not dominance invariant.
Then there exist 1 and 2 such that 1 2 but 1 2 . First note that neither 1 nor 2 can be the matching in which every agent is a singleton, since this matching is directly dominated by all other matchings (because all agents prefer to be matched over being unmatched). There are three possible matchings: i = ffig; fj; kgg, j = ffjg; fi; kgg and k = ffkg; fi; jgg. Assume, without loss of generality, that 2 = k and 1 = j . The same reasoning could be applied for any other pair of matchings satisfying 1 2 . Since 1 2 it must be [by Proposition 1] that i is better o¤ in 1 (since j is worse o¤ being unmatched). Note that k is also better o¤ in 1 since she is unmatched in 2 . But then i and k can enforce 1 over 2 and they are both better o¤, contradicting that 1 2 .
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5]
()) The existence of a ring S in the preferences with jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j, for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g is a su¢ cient condition for nonexistence of stable matchings in any roommate problem (dominance invariant or not). We prove it as follows:
Let be a matching such that (s i ) = j for some s i 2 S and some j = 2 S. This matching is blocked by the pair fs i ; s i 1 g. Therefore any matching containing a pair formed by an agent in the ring and an agent outside the ring is not stable. Consider then a matching 0 satisfying that 0 (s i ) = s i+1 and 0 (s i 1 ) = s i 1 (given that jSj = 3, maximizing the number of agents in the ring matched among themselves, there is always one agent in the ring who is alone at 0 ). This matching is blocked by the pair fs i 1 ; s i+1 g. Therefore any matching in which agents in S are matched among themselves is not stable. Hence, there is no matching stable as we wanted to prove.
(() Now, we will show that if a roommate problem is dominance invariant and unsolvable then there exists a ring S in P satisfying that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Let (N; P ) be unsolvable and dominance invariant. Since (N; P ) is unsolvable, by Lemma 2, there exists a ring S = fs 1 ; :::; s k g N where k is odd (an odd ring).
See Appendix A.
We …rst show that it must be jSj = 3. Suppose not, then consider fs 1 ; :::; s 4 g S.
Let 2 be a matching such that 2 (s 2 ) = s 3 and 2 (s) = s for every s = 2 fs 2 ; s 3 g, and let 1 be a matching such that 1 (s 1 ) = s 2 , 1 (s 3 ) = s 4 , and 1 (s) = s for every s = 2 fs 1 ; :::; s 4 g. Then 1 2 (since fs 3 ; s 4 g block 2 enforcing a matching in which s 1 and s 2 are alone, and this matching is blocked by the pair fs 1 ; s 2 g enforcing We now show that for any s i 2 S there cannot exist an agent j = 2 S such that j 2 M s i .
Suppose …rst that j 2 M s i and s i+1 s i j. Let 2 be a matching such that 2 (s i ) = s i+1 and 2 (s) = s for every s = 2 fs i ; s i+1 g, and let 1 be a matching such that 1 (s i+1 ) = s i 1 , 1 (s i ) = j, and 1 (s) = s for every s = 2 S [ fjg.
Then 1 2 (since fs i 1 ; s i+1 g block 2 enforcing a matching in which s i and j are alone, and this matching is blocked by the pair fs i ; jg enforcing 1 ).
However, 1 2 since 2 s i 1 , which contradicts that (N; P ) is dominance invariant.
Suppose instead that j 2 M s i and j s i s i+1 . Let 2 be a matching such that 2 (s i ) = s i 1 and 2 (s) = s for every s = 2 fs i ; s i 1 g, and let 1 be a matching such that 1 (s i ) = j, 1 (s i 1 ) = s i+1 , and 1 (s) = s for every s = 2 S [ fjg.
Then 1 2 (since fs i ; jg block 2 enforcing a matching in which s i+1 and s i 1 are alone, and this matching is blocked by the pair fs i+1 ; s i 1 g enforcing 1 ). However, 1 2 since 2 s i 1 1 , which contradicts that (N; P ) is dominance invariant.
By dominance invariance, every agent ranks her mutually acceptable agents higher than any other. Therefore, we can conclude that if the problem is unsolvable there is a ring S in P such that jSj = 3 and 8s i 2 S, s i+1 s i s i 1 s i j for any j 2 N n fs i+1 ; s i 1 g.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 6]
To prove that C(N; P ) = f C g, consider a dominance invariant roommate problem, (N; P ), with more than one matching in the core. By Lemma 1, we know that the matchings in the core dominate each other indirectly. However, by de…nition of stability, they do not dominate each other directly, contradicting that the problem is dominance invariant. Hence the core must be unique. Now we prove that C (i) = t(i) for all i 2 T and C (j) = j for all j = 2 T . Suppose that there is an agent i who is not matched in the core to her most preferred partner.
Let j = C (i) such that t(i) i j. Since j 6 = t(i), there exists an agent k such that k i j. Let 2 be a matching such that 2 (i) = k and the rest of the individuals are unmatched. By Lemma 1, C 2 . Assume that i k k, then C 2 since k i j and the pair fi; jg does not block 2 and enforce C . Therefore, k k i. Then fkg blocks 2 enforcing a new matching in which agent i is unmatched. So if C > 2 , then i = j proving that either C (i) = t(i) or C (i) = i.
